Christina R. Stokes v. Mary J. Pulley, Wendall Hansen, Camille Fowler, Jim Fowler, Travis Hansen, Troy Hansen and Regan Hansen : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Christina R. Stokes v. Mary J. Pulley, Wendall
Hansen, Camille Fowler, Jim Fowler, Travis
Hansen, Troy Hansen and Regan Hansen : Petition
for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
T. McKay Stirland; Donald E. McCandless; Fisher, Scribner & Stirland; Attorneys for Appellees.
Todd Utzinger; Hakeem Ishola; Ishola, Utzinger & Perretta; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Stokes v. Pulley, No. 960692 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/498






.A10 i^0CKET N0. °i(,o<rtz-*r--
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINA R. STOKES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MARY J. PULLEY, WENDALL HANSEN, 
CAMILLE FOWLER, JIM FOWLER, 
TRAVIS HANSEN, TROY HANSEN and 
REGAN HANSEN, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 960692-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
T. McKAY STIRLAND 
DONALD E. MCCANDLESS 
Fisher, Scribner & Stirland 
2696 N. University Ave., Ste. 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
TODD UTZINGER (6047) 
HAKEEM ISHOLA (5970) 
Ishola, Utzinger & Perretta 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3100 
Facsimile: (801)355-3123 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINA R. STOKES, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ; 
MARY J. PULLEY, WENDALL HANSEN, ) 
CAMILLE FOWLER, JIM FOWLER, ; 
TRAVIS HANSEN, TROY HANSEN and ] 
REGAN HANSEN, ; 
Defendants and Appellees. ] 
> Case No. 960692-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TODD UTZINGER (6047) 
HAKEEM ISHOLA (5970) 
Ishola, Utzinger & Perretta 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3100 
Facsimile: (801)355-3123 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
T. McKAY STIRLAND 
DONALD E. MCCANDLESS 
Fisher, Scribner & Stirland 
2696 N. University Ave., Ste. 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
OPINION FOR WHICH REHARING IS SOUGHT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CHALLENGED BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE AMONG APPELLEES'FAMILY MEMBERS, 
AND THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT A BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BEFORE 
APPELLANT PURCHASED HER PROPERTY. THIS ISSUE 
WAS THEREFORE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED WAIVED 2 
CONCLUSION 8 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH FILING 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 9 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Cummins v. Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 
129 P. 619, 624 (1913) 2 
Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'l Leasing Co.. 
888 P.2d 659 , 665 n.4 (Utah App. 1994) 3 
Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 
655 (Utah App. 1989) 3, 4 
State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682, 
684 (Utah App. 1989) 4 
State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1992) 4, 8 
Stokes v. Pulley, et. al.. Case No. 960692-CA 
(Utah App. June 25, 1998) 1,3 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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i Case No. 960692-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
OPINION FOR WHICH REHEARING IS SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks rehearing on this Court's opinion in Stokes v. Pulley, et aL Case 
No. 960692-CA (Utah App. June 25, 1998), a copy of which is attached hereto as 
addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Court hold appellant to too high a standard when it found her claim that 
there was a presumption against finding a boundary by acquiescence among family 
members had not been preserved for appeal because prior counsel indicated tltat issue 
was only "implicitly raised" even though the record shows appellant focused her closing 
argument at trial on showing that no boundary by acquiescence could have been 
created by inembers of appellees' family? 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A petition for rehearing is proper where the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended relevant facts or authority, or misapplied a principle of law. Cummins 
v. Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of this 
petition will demonstrate that the Court misapplied the doctrine of waiver by refusing to 
consider appellant's claim that there is a presumption against finding a boundary by 
acquiescence among family members and that the presumption was not overcome in 
this case. Appellant raised the issue of whether boundary by acquiescence could be 
established among members of appellees' family, and the trial court's finding of 
boundary by acquiescence during year a 33 year period — only twelve of which 
involved a finding of acquiescence by parties outside the appellees' family — reflects a 
rejection of appellant's argument. This Court should therefore grant rehearing and 
address the merits of appellant's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CHALLENGED BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
AMONG APPELLEES' FAMILY MEMBERS, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
RULED THAT A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE HAD BEEN 
ESTABLISHED BEFORE APPELLANT PURCHASED HER PROPERTY. 
THIS ISSUE WAS THEREFORE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL AND 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED WAIVED. 
In the proceedings below, appellant produced a legal deed that all parties agreed 
indicated her parcel of property extended past a fence and line of trees that were on her 
property (R. 546). At that juncture, the burden shifted to appellees to establish that the 
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fence/tree line had become a boundary by acquiescence among property owners on 
both sides of the boundary for a period of at least twenty years (R. 546).1 In response 
to the evidence and arguments advanced by appellees to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence, appellant squarely attacked reliance on that doctrine during times where 
only members of appellees' family claimed ownership of the property on both sides of 
the alleged boundary. In so doing, appellant preserved her challenge to boundary by 
acquiescence among family members. 
In holding that appellant failed to preserve the issue of whether family 
relationships create a presumption of nonacquiescence in an artificial boundary, this 
Court relied on prior counsel's use of the phrase "implicitly [raised]" to deem the issue 
waived on the ground that the claim was not "expressly preserved" for appellate review. 
Stokes v. Pulley. etal.. Case No. 960692-CA, Slip Op. at 1 (Utah App. June 25, 1998) 
(citations omitted). Deeming an issue waived or preserved based on whether it was 
either "implicitly" or "expressly" raised oversimplifies and misapprehends the doctrine of 
waiver. 
The doctrine of waiver is intended to bar parties from arguing issues that were 
not presented for the trial court's consideration. See Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'l 
Leasing Co.. 888 P.2d 659 , 665 n.4 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that issue not argued 
before the trial court was not preserved for appeal). An issue will be considered on 
appeal if the record shows that the issue was presented to the trial court in a manner 
sufficient to obtain a ruling. Salt Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah 
1
 Appellees could not claim possession of the disputed land by adverse 
possession because they had never paid taxes on it (R. 555). 
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App. 1989). Stated somewhat differently, "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." 
State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am. 771 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah App. 1989). 
In determining whether an issue was "sufficiently raised," this Court has made 
clear that an appellant need not utter the precise terms used on appeal in order to 
preserve a particular claim for appellate review; an issue is preserved so long as its 
substance is conveyed to the trial court, and the trial court has an opportunity to 
consider the claim. See State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah App. 1992) ("While 
the words 'due process,' or the language of section 201(3)(c), were never expressly 
referred to by Starnes's counsel, an objection to hearing the case on the basis of proffer 
was made, considered by the trial court, and rejected. The issue [of due process under 
section 201(3)(c)] was therefore preserved for appeal."). 
In this case, prior appellant counsel's use of the term "implicitly raised" should 
not be read so narrowly as to bar consideration of appellant's claim on appeal. A 
review of appellant's closing argument to the trial court demonstrates that one of her 
two primary strategies was limit the period of time that acquiescence by boundary could 
occur to only those years in which a non-family member owned property on one side of 
the alleged boundary. In attacking the second requirement of boundary by 
acquiescence — that landowners on both sides of an artificial boundary acquiesced to 
its treatment as a legal boundary — appellant consistently emphasized that the actions 
of the Pulley family indicated they considered the land one piece of property instead of 
two divided by the artificial boundary: 
Now for years, I guess, that land was owned by Pulleys on both 
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sides of it, and it didn't seem to ever become an argument as to whether 
who owned what. But it certainly doesn't match up to those cases where 
— for example, in one case — this [acquiescence] was proven because 
the party on one side of the fence tried to buy the land on the other side of 
the fence, and so the Court decided, "Well, that's obviously acquiescing 
because they thought it was the other person's land so they tried to buy 
it." 
R. 550-51. 
Trial counsel's argument plainly challenged the notion that there could have 
been a boundary by acquiescence among family members where the actions of the 
family suggest the fence and tree line was not treated as a legal boundary. In other 
words, since there was never any dispute among members of the Pulley family about 
use or possession of the land on either side of the fence, the fence itself could not have 
been considered a boundary by acquiescence among family members. 
The significance of appellant's claim that family members could not create a 
boundary by acquiescence is made clear a few paragraphs later in her argument. Still 
discussing the issue of whether there had been mutual acquiescence, counsel 
introduces the third requirement for establishing a boundary by acquiescence, namely 
that there be acquiescence for a period of at least twenty continuous years (R. 552). 
That point is made in conjunction with the fact that it was not until 1967 or 1968 that any 
of the disputed property was conveyed to someone outside the Pulley family: 
I guess what the Court has to decide, and what the defendant here 
is going to try and show is that previous owners prior to [appellant] had 
acquiesced in that line of the boundary. 
And again, I'll ask the Court to look at whether or not that occurred. 
The only real evidence on that was the Madsens [who bought the land in 
1967] and the Boyers [who bought the land from the Madsens and sold it 
to appellant in 1979] — the Boyers couldn't even remember in telling 
[appellant] that there was a boundary discrepancy. They couldn't 
remember the meeting, in fact, in that — the disclosure meeting which 
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occurred. 
Between the two of them [the Madsens and the Boyers] they 
owned the land between 1968 and 1979, its only 11 years. I think 
importantly before 1968 there is no evidence — 1968 is when the 
Madsens moved in. Prior to that time the only evidence that's been 
provided is Ronald Pulley. And Ronald Pulley, by his own admission, did 
not live in that house since 1962 or so. There's no evidence here from 
Adolfus or any other prior owners. 
R. 552-53. 
Appellant's argument was an attempt to limit the time period that acquiescence 
could have occurred to the years after 1967 — the year that part of the Pulley property 
now owned by appellant was first conveyed to someone outside the Pulley family — 
and before 1979 when appellant acquired the property. Appellant sought to limit that 
time frame by attacking the very notion of a boundary by acquiescence among close 
family members. 
In response to appellant's argument, appellee in fact countered that there had 
been a boundary by acquiescence based on the actions of landowners preceding 
appellant (R. 559-61). Significantly, in order to achieve the necessary period of twenty 
years, appellees had to rely on their claim that members of their own family had 
considered the fence/tree line a boundary (R. 559-60). Appellant knew that would be 
the case, and that is why appellant challenged the notion that a boundary by 
acquiescence could be created among family members who did not have a dispute over 
the boundary but had instead treated the land as "one piece of property" (R. 563). 
In rebuttal, appellant returned to her theme of no acquiescence among family 
members who treated the land as one piece of property: 
Secondly, during that period of time prior to — I guess it was the 
Madsens or the Boyers — the testimony was that Mary [Pulley] mowed 
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and watered both sides [of the fence/tree line] or both lawns, and then it 
wasn't until some time later that she disconnected [the water pipes to the 
other side of the fence] and we don't now when. She disconnected the 
water pipes, and the land the Stokes' property now became somewhat 
yellow and dry, because it wasn't being watered or taken care of. 
But previous to that time she did both sides, she took care of it and 
mowed it and she watered both sides. It tends to indicate that really, 
since it was close family on both sides, that it was treated as one piece of 
property. There wasn't a boundary where they needed to dispute over or 
get right or get corrected, make sure it's where it was supposed to be. It 
was treated as one property by sister and brother. 
R. 563. 
Appellant's argument at trial was focused on a distinct theme aimed at 
undermining the appellees' claim that owners prior to appellant had considered the 
fence/tree line a boundary. Appellant's primary claim was that where members of the 
same family own the land on both sides of an alleged artificial boundary no boundary by 
acquiescence can occur where the family acts as though the land is one piece of 
property. 
To finally drive her point home, in her concluding argument appellant again 
emphasized that it was not until after someone outside the Pulley family obtained part 
of the land that boundary by acquiescence could be established: 
The first time [any part of the land] became someone else's 
property was with the Madsens, and that was in 1968,1 believe is what 
they testified — 1967 or 1968, and at that time is when you go back to the 
boundary of acquiescence [f]or a long period of time. Prior to that it was 
treated [as one piece of property] by brother and sister, she mowed them 
both and cared for both [sides of the fence], since that time it was 
separate. 
R. 563. 
In sum, although appellant did not utter the precise words "presumption against 
boundary by acquiescence among family members," she advanced that argument in 
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substance. In ruling that a boundary by acquiescence had been created during a 
period including years that members of the Pulley family owned the land on both sides 
of the alleged boundary, the trial court necessarily rejected appellant's argument. 
Appellant's claim was therefore preserved for appellate review. See Starnes, 841 P.2d 
at 716 (though the precise terms advanced on appeal were not used at trial, substance 
of claim was raised and rejected by trial court and issue was therefore preserved). 
CONCLUSION 
Had the trial court accepted appellant's argument that there could be no 
boundary by acquiescence among members of the Pulley family, appellees would not 
have been able to establish acquiescence for the requisite period of twenty years. 
Given the presumption in favor of adhering to the legal descriptions of property 
boundaries, appellant would have prevailed at trial and on appeal. This Court should 
therefore grant appellant's petition for rehearing and address the merits of whether 
there was evidence to overcome a presumption against boundary by acquiescence 
among family members. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s j ^ d a y of July, 1998. 
ISHOLA, UTZINGER & PERRETTA 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TODD U T Z I N G E R K 
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH FILING 
As required under rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel 
hereby certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
ISHOLA, UTZINGER & PERRETTA 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TODD UTZINGER S 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
T. McKAY STIRLAND 
DONALD E. MCCANDLESS 
Fisher, Scribner & Stirland 
2696 N. University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 960S92-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 25 , 1998) 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Ray Harding, Sr. 
Attorneys: Helen H. Anderson, Provo, for Appellant 
T. McKay Stirland and Donald E. McCandless, Provo, 
for Appellees 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant concedes she only "implicitly" preserved the issue 
of whether family relationships create a presumption of 
nonacquiescence in an artificial boundary. However, "an issue 
must be expressly preserved below to warrant appellate 
consideration." State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 273 n.4 (Utah 
Ct. App.) (emphasis in original), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 
(Utah 1995). Thus, because appellant failed to expressly raise 
this issue below, we do not reach it. 
Although appellant also failed to object to the trial 
court's finding of mutual acquiescence, she is free to raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) . 
Nonetheless, this finding was amply supported by, inter alia, 
testimony from 97-year-old John Pulley, a firsthand witness to 
the boundary acquiescence, who testified in no uncertain terms 
that the acquiescence occurred. Thus, we cannot say the trial 
court clearly erred in finding mutual acquiescence in the 
boundary. 
Similarly, we see no clear error in the trial court's 
finding that the properties were adjoining. The existence of a 
gap in recorded legal descriptions, while no doubt problematic in 
other real property contexts and in regard to the rights of third 
parties, is wholly inconsequential in an action to determine an 
acquiesced-in boundary between neighboring landowners--especially 
given the trial court's finding that the properties were 
contiguous as a matter of fact. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's 
judgment. However, we decline to grant appellee's request for 
attorney fees on appeal. Appellant's arguments on appeal, 
especially her issue as to what constitutes "adjacent" 
properties, are sufficiently meritorious that, although 
unavailing, they cannot be regarded as frivoxous. 
960692-CA 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of June, 1998, a true and 
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the 
United States mail to: 
Helen H. Anderson 
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Provo UT 84601 
T. McKay Stirland 
Donald E. McCandless 
Fisher, Scribner & Stirland 
2696 N University Ave #220 
Provo UT 84604 
and a true and correct" copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below: 
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